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THEORETICAL ARTICLE
Beyond crime rates and community surveys: 
a new approach to police accountability 
and performance measurement
Tarah Hodgkinson1* , Tullio Caputo2 and Michael L. McIntyre3
Abstract 
In this conceptual piece, we argue that the current approach to police performance measurement typically based on 
the use of traditional police metrics has failed to achieve the desired results and that a different strategy is required. 
Traditional police metrics have a narrow focus on crime and the police response to it. They provide little information 
on how well police organizations are performing. Importantly, traditional police metrics do not incorporate input 
from police stakeholders in goal identification, nor do they use specifically designed indicators to assess progress 
towards achieving these goals. Following an analysis of the criticisms levelled at the use of traditional police metrics, 
and subsequent attempts to address these issues, we argue that a networked governance approach represents a 
more promising foundation for undertaking police organizational performance assessment. Such an approach would 
engage stakeholders more directly in goal identification and performance assessment, and potentially lead to more 
successful, responsive and accountable policing.
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Introduction
In the early 1990s, a ‘businesslike’ approach to pub-
lic administration known as New Public Management 
(NPM), began to take root in the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and many other western nations (Hartley 
2005; Hough 2010; Micheli and Neely 2010). The impe-
tus for NPM came, in part, from growing concerns over 
mounting budget deficits and the desire by governments 
to gain greater control over public sector organizations 
like the police (den Heyer 2011). The impact of these pol-
icies and the changes they created in police organizations 
cannot be overstated. As Reiner (2013:171) notes, the 
reforms aimed at policing in the United Kingdom, includ-
ing the use of performance measurement, have been the 
most substantial in the past 50 years “and, arguably in the 
nearly two centuries since the establishment of the mod-
ern British police”. And, despite a shift in performance 
metrics to alternative such as public confidence through 
procedural justice, many police organizations continue to 
experience pressures to demonstrate accountability.
In this conceptual paper, we consider the growing 
emphasis on performance measurement in policing with 
a particular focus on the Canadian context. We explore 
the criticisms levelled at the use of traditional police met-
rics for performance assessment, then consider some of 
the alternatives that have been proposed for overcom-
ing these criticisms including a shift to examining police 
legitimacy through procedural justice. Finally, we outline 
what we believe to be a more fruitful and meaningful 
approach to police organizational performance measure-
ment—one that builds on well-established governance 
principles that offer a promising way of addressing police 
organizational performance concerns, while prioritizing 
police legitimacy and accountability. In this way, we out-
line a path forward for policing, that shifts organizational 
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History and background
Police organizations were originally exempted from 
the types of budget cuts, austerity measures and other 
changes imposed on public sector organizations as a 
result of NPM-inspired reforms because they were con-
sidered an ‘essential service’ (Butterfield et al. 2004). This 
situation began to change, however, in the mid-2000s as 
the global recession put increasing pressure on govern-
mental budgets (Edwards and Skidmore 2006). For exam-
ple, in Canada, the per capita cost of policing has risen 
steadily since the 1950s. Accounting for inflation, Cana-
dian policing budgets have grown more than 40% since 
1986 reaching $14.7 billion in 2016 (approximately $315 
per capita and 26% higher than in 2006) (Conor 2017).
Concerns over policing costs prompted the Canadian 
federal government to launch an “economics of polic-
ing” initiative in 2012. This initiative focused on finding 
ways of delivering more ‘efficient and effective’ policing 
services while reducing policing costs (Drummond 2012; 
Leuprecht 2014; Di Matteo 2014; Public Safety Canada 
2018).
Considerations of the costs of policing are clearly 
important since they represent a significant expenditure 
for municipal, provincial and federal levels of govern-
ment in Canada. However, a more nuanced discussion 
about these costs is required given public expectations of 
the police, the increasing complexity of police work, and 
the greater time required to adequately perform policing 
tasks considering the legal requirements under which the 
police currently operate (e.g. regulations regarding the 
handling of domestic conflict calls). As well, there has 
been growing public demand for greater police account-
ability and legitimacy in Canada, as a result of a series of 
high-profile incidents involving the police, and the devel-
opment of the National Inquiry into Missing and Mur-
dered Indigenous Women and Children, and the Black 
Lives Matter Movement (Lucchesi and Echo-Hawk 2019; 
Reiti 2016). These developments have put policing high 
on the public policy agenda in Canada in recent years as 
has been the case in many liberal democracies.
Police performance assessment and the use of traditional 
police metrics
The current context of policing in Canada includes a 
growing emphasis on police performance measurement 
frameworks by police organizations (ICURS 2014). His-
torically, policy makers and police leaders have typically 
used existing police metrics, such as crime rates and 
clearance rates, to assess police performance. Indeed, the 
Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) were developed in the 
early 1900s specifically for this purpose. However, tradi-
tional police metrics such as the UCR have a very narrow 
focus on crime and the police response to it (which the 
UCR also measures poorly) while providing little infor-
mation on how well police organizations are run (Magu-
ire and Uchida 2000). Nor does the UCR provide any 
detail on the unique context of similar criminal incidents 
(e.g. one assault can be very different from another and 
require different police response). Furthermore, clear-
ance rates do not provide any indication about the type of 
service provided by the police beyond whether an arrest 
was made, or the case was solved.
The four main types of information reported in exist-
ing police metrics include: crime rates, clearance rates, 
response times and productivity or workload statistics 
(e.g. number of arrests, citations, stops and checks, etc.) 
(Collier 2001; Fielding and Innes 2006; Maguire 2003; 
Sparrow 2015). These metrics do not alone address police 
goals, nor do they include specific indicators designed 
to track progress towards goal achievement. Implicitly, 
police organizations are understood to be, “doing a good 
job” in relation to how well they perform on the above-
mentioned traditional police metrics, rather than what 
some might consider legitimate police goals. While the 
police have some ability to impact the rise and fall of offi-
cial crime statistics, most of these changes are a result of 
indirect police behaviour. For example, different attend-
ing officers may record an incident as more or less severe 
depending on a number of factors. If this is done over 
time it could impact crime rates. However, traditional 
police metrics continue to be used despite ongoing criti-
cisms including questions about what is being measured, 
what is being missed, how the data are collected, and how 
other data sources (like victim surveys) compare with 
these metrics (Maguire and Uchida 2000; Wells et  al. 
2005). Four general critiques of traditional police metrics 
are outlined below.
The first critique is that they are methodologically 
unsound. Critics claim that traditional police metrics like 
crime rates are ill defined, poorly specified, and often do 
not capture the actual amount of crime that occurs in a 
given area (Rein and Winship 1999). Reporting practices 
have received particular attention with respect to the 
methodological criticisms levelled at traditional police 
metrics. The research on reporting practices suggests 
that high reporting rates are often linked to a variety of 
factors (Fielding and Innes 2006). For example, increas-
ing the number of police officers on the street could lead 
to higher crime rates because there are more police avail-
able to witness and report crime, rather than having to 
rely on the public to make these reports (Rein and Win-
ship 1999). Additionally, crime rates can decrease if citi-
zens fail to report crimes because they do not trust their 
police (Reiner 2010). Even crimes that have relatively 
high reporting rates, such as auto-theft and homicide, 
have been shown to be more correlated with an increase 
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in security and a reduction in criminal opportunities, 
than the performance of the local police organization 
(Hodgkinson et al. 2016; Farrell et al. 2018).
A second critique notes that traditional police metrics 
are too narrow. They tend to focus on particular kinds of 
crime (e.g. public order, interpersonal violence, property 
crime) while failing to adequately address arguably more 
serious crime categories (e.g. white-collar crime, corpo-
rate crime, fraud, or cybercrime) that are often difficult 
or expensive to investigate, go undetected by victims, or 
are not reported to avoid damage to the affected organi-
zation’s reputation (Mailley et al. 2008; Sommer 2004).
Traditional police metrics are also too narrow because 
they fail to address important aspects of police work 
(Maguire 2003). For example, up to 70% of police calls 
for service are not crime related (McFee and Taylor 2014; 
Di Matteo 2014), with many being in response to men-
tal health issues (Coleman and Cotton 2014) or other 
non-criminal social problems like addictions, poverty, 
and homelessness (Goldstein 2018). These non-criminal 
social problems go unrecorded by traditional police met-
rics, but account for a large proportion of what the police 
actually do in the course of carrying out their normal 
duties. As well, traditional police metrics fail to account 
for the time devoted to administrative and operational 
tasks such as report writing, attending court, attending 
hospitals, and directing traffic (Leuprecht 2014; Murphy 
2004).
Traditional police metrics also place relatively little 
emphasis on crime prevention and other practices that 
can enhance community safety and improve police-stake-
holder relationships (Wells et al. 2005). Ironically, exclud-
ing these activities from the metrics used to assess police 
organizational performance penalizes police organiza-
tions that are working proactively to prevent crime and 
enhance community safety (Collier 2001; Feltham and 
Xie 1994).
A third critique of traditional police metrics focuses 
specifically on the way they are used to influence public 
perception. Some observers note that in order to dem-
onstrate significant declines, crime rates need to be high 
in the first place. These critics claim that it is difficult to 
reduce crime rates below a certain level (i.e. a statistical 
floor effect), and while attempting to do so may be politi-
cally expedient, it wastes valuable police resources on a 
pursuit that cannot succeed (Sparrow 2015).
Additionally, crime rates have been declining interna-
tionally for more than two decades and these declines 
cannot be explained by individual police service strate-
gies (Farrell 2013). In fact, the police actually have lim-
ited ability to influence the crime rate with some critics 
arguing that they play a largely symbolic role that pri-
marily serves to reassure the public (see Manning 2003). 
This does not mean that reducing crime is not a valuable 
policing goal but needs to be considered as one of the 
several contributions made by modern policing that is 
worth measuring.
The fourth critique focuses on the negative conse-
quences associated with the use of performance met-
rics themselves. For example, some observers argue that 
an excessive emphasis on crime control metrics such 
as arrest rates, can lead to violations of civil liberties or 
ignoring community satisfaction with the police (Moore 
and Poethig 1999). This is problematic, since, according 
to procedural justice researchers, public confidence in 
the police has been found to be an important predictor 
of overall feelings of community safety as well as com-
pliance with the law (Shilston 2011; Tyler and Murphy 
2011).
Others have suggested that overemphasizing perfor-
mance measurement can lead some officers to ‘game 
the system’. This can take various forms, including fail-
ing to report negative incidents and manipulating the 
data to make it look like performance is good even if it 
is not (Courty and Marschke 2004; Espeland and Sauder 
2007). Some have suggested that gaming the system can 
become institutionalized to the point that the main goal 
of reporting and recording practices becomes production 
of the expected results rather than accuracy (Loveday 
2000). As Patrick (2009) points out, statistics can and will 
be manipulated when the stakes are high.
Importantly, traditional police metrics fail to tell pol-
icy makers and stakeholders very much about what the 
police are actually doing or how well a police organiza-
tion is operating. Critics have argued that traditional 
police metrics more accurately reflect the activities of 
offenders than those of the police (Hoogenboezem and 
Hoogenboezem 2005).
In response to the wide-ranging criticisms levelled at 
traditional police metrics, numerous authors have sug-
gested a variety of alternatives including developing and 
using better indicators, qualitative measures, or conduct-
ing public/staff satisfaction surveys (Shilston 2011; Wells 
et al. 2005; Rosenbaum et al. 2015). The policing literature 
is replete with new models and other alternatives to cur-
rent police performance measurement schemes as many 
police services move away from traditional performance 
metrics or have discarded these metrics altogether. Bar-
lage et al. (2014) suggest that performance measurement 
should focus on objective versus subjective measures by 
using a multi-trait/multi-method (testing response bias 
across different response groups while testing the valid-
ity of the measures) approach. In England and Wales, the 
PEEL (Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy) 
program brings together numerous measures of police 
activity to provide the public with a standard to evaluate 
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police performance (HMIC 2017). Barton and Beynon 
(2011) introduced the PROMETHEE ranking technique 
that uses secondary data on sanction detection levels to 
improve police performance in a specific area. And oth-
ers are attempting to identify better measures and indi-
cators (Guilfoyle 2015), measure additional factors such 
as city-level attributes (Sharp and Johnson 2009), and 
use citizen surveys to evaluate police-citizen encounters 
and public satisfaction (Shilston 2011; Rosenbaum et al. 
2015).
While the proposed alternatives to traditional police 
metrics may provide better indicators or ways of meas-
uring, they do not resolve the fundamental challenges 
inherent in the use of traditional police metrics for 
assessing police organizational performance (Maguire 
and Uchida 2000). An important consideration for those 
concerned about this issue is that existing police metrics 
were not specifically designed to address the questions 
inherent in determining how well a police organiza-
tion operates and fulfils its role in community safety. For 
example, in the current context there are few measures of 
what might indicate that progress has been made towards 
achieving stated policing goals.1 This is remarkable 
because what the police are doing about crime may actu-
ally be antithetical to what governments and the public 
desire.
Rethinking performance metrics according 
to organizational goals
We believe that a different approach to police organiza-
tional performance measurement is required: one that is 
more attuned to the expectations of local stakeholders, 
including governance and oversight bodies, as well as 
community members. An important starting point would 
require acknowledging the need for greater input and 
involvement by local stakeholders in discussions regard-
ing the role of the police in a democratic society, realis-
tic expectations for those undertaking these roles, and 
a consideration of the expectations of the people being 
served (Goldstein 2018; Sparrow 2015; Moore and Braga 
2003). Appropriate organizational performance assess-
ment frameworks, specific to the police service, could 
then be developed based on well-established evaluation 
principles (goal identification, logic models, tailored 
indicators, regular data collection/analysis, ameliorative 
action based on evidence, etc.).
A growing body of literature provides important 
insights into what an alternative approach might look 
like. Newman (2001), for example, discusses a model that 
shifts governance away from current practices towards a 
more networked form, in which stakeholders are directly 
involved in the identification of organizational goals and 
how these are to be pursued (expectations about police 
behaviour). In this way, networked governance can pro-
vide stakeholders with the voice they require to help 
shape police service policies and practices, so their needs 
and expectations can be more adequately addressed 
(Fung 2009; Bryson et al. 2014).
Networked governance has been gaining traction in 
community safety and public service management. For 
example, in Vancouver, Canada, a collaborative model 
of decision making was used to transform homelessness 
policy and allot funding to mutually agreed upon services 
(Doberstein 2016). This model demonstrated that net-
worked governance is far more advantageous than cur-
rent governance approaches, highlighting in particular, 
the importance of the ‘process’ of networked governance.
The policing literature includes other examples of a 
networked approach to police governance and how this 
might work at the organizational level. Moore and Braga 
(2003), for example, assert that stakeholders should 
be involved in measuring how the actions of the police 
contribute to the safety of their communities. An exam-
ple of this is demonstrated in the Nexus project in Aus-
tralia where participating police organizations work with 
communities to determine what they want their police 
organizations to achieve in relation to community safety, 
and what their vision of policing is for the 21st century 
(Shearing and Marks 2011). Similarly, “Measuring what 
Matters”, a federally sponsored project in the US, includes 
stakeholder engagement as a means of identifying public 
expectations of the police regarding community safety 
(Moore 2002; Moore and Braga 2003; Sparrow 2015).
If such an approach were to be used more broadly in 
policing, police leaders would have to work more closely 
with stakeholders, be more responsive to their input 
and guidance, and be more flexible and facilitative in 
their leadership roles (Moore 2000; Hartley 2005). At 
the same time, such an approach would require stake-
holders to be more engaged and willing to participate in 
co-producing the outcomes they desire. In addition to 
community members, we argue it is important to engage 
institutional stakeholders who are informed about the 
issues at hand (Simmons 2007). These institutional 
stakeholders should be drawn from the partners who 
comprise the community safety constellation and have a 
stake in working towards safe and healthy communities 
(see Caputo and McIntyre 2015). These include health 
care providers, educators, social service providers, and 
even private security firms (Shearing and Marks 2011). 
Finally, to address issues of conflict and consensus, unbi-
ased and experienced facilitators would contribute to the 
1 Police goals are rarely specified or clearly stated. Rather, performance met-
rics are chosen somewhat arbitrarily, and seldomly with the intention of 
measuring what the police organization wants to achieve.
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governance process (Morley and Trist 1993; Hodgkinson 
2018).
A networked governance approach would address 
the issue of performance measurement in a way that is 
appropriate for police organizations in the 21st century 
(see Council of Canadian Academies 2014). It would lead 
to goal setting for the police that is:
a. Deliberate and intentional because it reflects the 
results of a collaborative process and negotiated 
agreements;
b. Aligned with what a police organization can actually 
do;
c. Aligned with stakeholder expectations; and,
d. Linked to a suitable reference point for after-the-fact 
evaluation;
This type of approach would place the interaction 
between the police and their stakeholders at the centre 
of the oversight and accountability process. The police 
would be required to keep their stakeholders informed of 
the progress they are making toward jointly determined 
goals through the use of indicators that were also jointly 
identified. Based on an assessment of these performance 
measures, changes could be made as necessary to help 
a police organization become more successful going 
forward.
We acknowledge that this proposal is a complex task. 
Police organizations have several stakeholders (outlined 
above) who often differ in their expectations of police. 
We do not believe that consensus around these goals is 
a possibility or even a worthwhile pursuit. In fact, some 
argue that conflict is necessary to the networked govern-
ance process (O’Leary and Vij 2012). Rather, we argue 
that the process of networked governance is meant to 
create context specific metrics, that measure the ability 
of police to address locally identified needs and problems 
while acknowledging that these issues are subjective to 
local needs and experiences.
While the proposed approach calls for the collabora-
tive setting of strategic goals, we recognize that opera-
tional decisions about how to achieve these goals should 
be left to police professionals. The distinction between 
strategic goals and operational decisions is an impor-
tant one because it helps to clarify the role of the vari-
ous participants in the community safety enterprise. For 
example, while police will continue to respond to calls for 
service (violence-related calls would continue to take pri-
ority), how they frame these issues, and strategize their 
response will be co-determined and in line with mutually 
agreed upon priorities, such as those created by organi-
zations like the American Bar Association’s Standards for 
the Urban Police Function (ABA 2018).
A networked governance approach goes further than 
requiring the police to seek information or input from 
the community about its concerns or priorities as is done 
in the existing community consultation process used by 
most police organizations. Rather, the goals that emerge 
in networked governance should be co-determined by 
police leadership and their stakeholders such as govern-
ance or oversight bodies, institutional partners, and other 
community representatives (McKnight and Kretzmann 
1996; Hodgkinson and Saville 2018).2 In doing so, police 
response becomes imperative rather than an elective that 
can be easily ignored by police leaders or to which they 
can merely pay lip service (Klockars 1988). Additionally, 
these goals are implemented at the organizational level, 
contributing to ‘systematic’ rather than episodic changes 
in policing and community safety (Goldstein 2018). These 
goals then become the standard that stakeholders can use 
to assess the performance of their police organizations 
and this process will contribute to greater transparency 
as well as police accountability and legitimacy.
Conclusions
The introduction of police reforms based on NPM-
inspired policies has had a dramatic impact on police 
organizations. This has been most evident in the increas-
ing emphasis placed on police organizational perfor-
mance measurement including the narrowly conceived 
performance imperatives exemplified by the rubric of 
efficiency and effectiveness and “value for money”. We 
submit that police performance measurement conceived 
of in this way fails to achieve its objectives while miss-
ing much of the public’s concerns related to police legiti-
macy and accountability. Further, the reliance on existing 
traditional police metrics has privileged crime control 
over other policing functions even though this accounts 
for between a quarter and a third of all calls for service 
received by the police. Clearly a much broader focus 
is required for police performance assessment if the 
myriad concerns related to community safety are to be 
addressed.
Our view is that a more fulsome approach to assessing 
the performance of police organizations is required—one 
this is more “bottom-up” and organic in nature. That is, 
it should be based on the collaborative identification of 
policing goals arrived at by a closer working relation-
ship between the police and their primary stakeholders. 
Moreover, once such goals are identified, appropriate 
indicators should be created for assessing whether pro-
gress is being made towards achieving them. Questions 
2 For examples on how to engage in this process with community stakehold-
ers see: Morley and Trist (1993) or Saville (2018).
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about police organizational performance would then 
revolve around the collection and sharing of the req-
uisite information on an ongoing basis among police 
leaders and their stakeholders. Assessments of the per-
formance of a police organization could then be made 
based on whether and to what extent it is achieving its 
stated goals. In this way, the assessment of police organi-
zational performance would be based on evidence that 
specifically addresses this issue rather than on the expe-
dient use of narrow crime-based and organizational met-
rics (work load statistics) that are readily at hand. In the 
proposed approach, police organizational performance 
would be assessed against the backdrop of broader com-
munity safety goals while increasing the potential for 
more democratic, responsive and accountable policing 
organizations.
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